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ENARGEIA: A CONCEPT FOR ALL SEASONS 
DENNIS R. BORMANN 
Department of Speech Communication 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588 
INTRODUCTION 
Aristotle, writing in the fourth century B.C., defmed 
rhetoric as the "faculty of discovering in the particular case 
what are the available means of persuasion" (Aristotle, 1932, 
1 :2). He then proceeded to classify proofs intrinsic to the art 
of speaking into three modes-logos, ethos, and pathos. 
Consistent with his ''scientific'' point of view, he deplored 
writers of the arts of speaking who ignored argument; and his 
treatise emphasized the logical element in persuasion. As he 
said, persuasion is "effected by the arguments, when we 
demonstrate the truth, real or apparent, by such means as 
inhere in particular cases" (Aristotle, 1 :2). That the purpose 
of much public, popular discourse throughout the ages has 
been to persuade or convince is obvious. However, the ques-
tion of how the speaker or writer is to establish belief in his 
proposition and, in addition, appeal to the emotional and, 
imaginative side of his audience has offered much scope for 
theorizing among rhetoricians. Naturally, as conceptions of 
human knowledge and human nature changed, theories of 
suasory discourse changed, too. Not all later rhetoricians 
agreed with Aristotle that enthymematic reasoning formed 
the body and substance of persuasion. 
The ancient-rhetorical notion of enargeia (clearness, 
distinctness, vividness), however, played a very influential 
role in many theoretical discussions among later thinkers. 
literary critics and aestheticians also considered enargeia as 
a quality of writing that could arouse emotions and give 
aesthetic pleasure. Finally, enargeia was revived by Descartes 
and the Cartesians as a criterion of truth and played a promi-
nent role in philosophic discussions in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. 
ENARGEIA IN RHETORICAL AND 
UTERARY THEORY 
The Greeks were the first to offer a theory of imagina-
tive appeal which, they thought, could produce the desired 
response in a listener or reader. Although Aristotle stressed 
the enthymeme as an engine of persuasion, he was keenly 
aware of the functional, rhetorical effect of language on lis-
teners. In Book III of the Rhetoric, he considers linguistic 
devices which promote vivid description and lively or popular 
sayings. He claims that audiences like words ''that set an event 
before their eyes; for they must see the thing occurring now, 
not hear of it as in the future. In style, accordingly, the 
speaker must aim at these three points: Metaphor, Anti-
thesis, Actuality" (Aristotle, 3 :10). Metaphors, he claims, 
give liveliness and vividness to composition. He puts particular 
emphasis on placing objects before the mind's eye as tp.ough 
they were living and moving. He writes, "But we have still to 
explain what is meant by setting things 'before the eyes,' 
and how this is to be affected. What I mean is, using expres-
sions that show things in a state of activity. It is a metaphor, 
indeed, to say that a good man is 'four-square,' ... but the 
metaphor suggests no activity. There is, on the other hand, a 
sense of activity in the expression 'with his vigor fully bloom-
ing' " (Aristotle, 3:11). Thus, we fmd in the Aristotelian 
treatment of rhetorical style an emphasis on linguistic devices 
which promote vivid description and a lively .or vivid represen-
tation of the facts. The orator is to set things before the 
audience's eyes; he is to paint verbal pictures. 
The great Roman rhetorician, Quintillian (1960, 6.2: 
29-30), clearly stated the relationship between vivid descrip-
tion (or enargeia) and emotional arousal which also con-
tributes to belief in the reality or actuality of the scene being 
described. 
But how are we to generate these emotions in our-
selves, since emotion is not in our own power? 
I will try to explain as best I may. There are 
certain experiences ... the Romans [call] visions, 
whereby things absent are present to our imagin-
ation with such extreme vividness that they seem 
actually to be before our very eyes. It is the man 
who is really sensitive to such impressions who 
will have the greatest power over the emotions .... 
This power of vivid imagination, whereby things, 
words and actions are presented in the most realis-
tic manner . . . is a power which all may readily 
acquire if they will. When the mind is unoccupied 
or is absorbed by fantastic hopes or daydreams, we 
are haunted by these visions of which I am speak-
ing to such an extent that we imagine that we are 
traveling abroad, crossing the sea, fighting, address-
ing the people, or enjoying the use of wealth that 
we do not actually possess, and seem .to ourselves 
not to be dreaming but acting. Surely, then, it 
may be possible to tum this form of hallucination 
to some profit. 
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And in a later passage Quintilian (1960,62:32) writes: 
"From such impressions arises that enargeia which Cicero 
calls illumination and actuality, which make us seem not so 
much to narrate as to exhibit the actual s.cene, while our 
emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were 
present at the actual occurrence." Although Quintilian is 
pointing to the emotional efficacy of clear and vivid word 
pictures, he also relates enargeia to illumination and actual-
ity. 
Next, I would like to turn to another great Greek 
critic, probably of the same century as Quintilian, whose 
writings belong to the poetic as well as the rhetorical tradi-
tion-i.e., Longinus. In the fifteenth chapter of On the Sub-
lime, Longinus talks of enargeia. He is discussing the second of 
his five sources of sublimity, viz., vehement and inspired 
passion. Longinus (1962 :2) says that in his time the word 
imagination 
has now come to be used predOminantly of pass-
ages where, inspired by strong emotion, you seem 
to see what you describe and bring it vividly 
before the eyes of your audience. That imagina-
tion means one thing in oratory and another in 
poetry you will yourself detect, and also that the 
object of poetry is to enthrall, of prose writing to 
present things vividly, though both aim at this 
latter and at excited feeling. 
After citing some examples from poetry which "show a 
romantic exaggeration, far exceeding the limits of credibility ," 
Longinus says that the proper use of imagination in oratory 
is to convince the audience of the "reality and truth" of the 
speaker's assertions. He quotes passages from Demosthenes 
where, he claims, imagination persuades by going beyond 
argument: "When combined with argumentative treatment," 
it not only convinces the audience, ''it positively masters 
them" (Longinus, 15 :9). 
From these few passages in Aristotle, Quintilian, and 
Longinus, then, it is clear that the ancient rhetoricians advo-
cated the vivid description of objects, persons, scenes, or 
events in discourse. Such concrete verbal portraits, they 
thought, could serve at least four important functions: (1) 
they aroused the emotions and the passions; (2) they created 
aesthetic enjoyment; (3) they helped to hold attention and 
interest; and, finally, (4) they even contributed to belief. 
Lively and vividly descriptive language can raise the ideas of 
the imagination to almost the same vividness of sense impres-
sions. Enargeia can "almost compel the audience to see what 
... [the author] imagined" (Longinus, 15:3). 
Naturally, in poetic and rhetorical discourse,itis by the 
proper use of language-particularly figurative language-that 
the writer or speaker must seek to raise the imaginative de-
scription to the vividness of actual sense perception. Certain 
figures were recommended in rhetorical treatises as partic-
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ularly important for such purposes-metaphor, simile, vision, 
and ocular demonstration. In Lane Cooper's translation of 
Aristotle (1932) there are two figures which are derived from 
the Greek doctrine of enargeia: descriptio or vivid description; 
and demonstratio or ocular demonstrations: "when an event 
is so described in words that the business seems to be enacted 
and the subject to pass vividly before our eyes." 
Although the notion of vivid description seems to have 
originated with the rhetoricians, it was later to become firmly 
entrenched in poetic theory, too. One reason for the popu-
larity of descriptive passages in poetry, no doubt, was the .• 
Latin notion of ut pictura poesis. Horace had said that poetry 
is like painting, and most Renaissance literary critics repeated 
the clicM that poetry is like a picture. Because of this parallel 
between the arts, it was common to describe the poet's (or 
rhetorician's) task in language in terms of painting. If the 
verbal arts are similar to painting, then they should be speak-
ing pictures. Thus, the imagery of color came into discussions 
of poetic and rhetorical compositions. Writers and speakers 
were urged to "paint in living colors," or to "paint before the 
eyes," with verbal portraits. 
From the time of the early Greeks and Romans, the 
advice to speakers and writers was to paint before the eyes 
of the audience with clear, distinct, and vivid, verbal por-
traits. These commonplaces about the importance of ocular 
demonstration were repeated throughout the Renaissance and 
the seventeenth century in almost all treatises on rhetoric and 
poetry. The doctrine of vivid description was very popular in 
the eighteenth century. An index to how widespread the no-
tion was can be found in the following passage from Reid 
(1969:397-98): 
It seems easier to form a lively conception of 
objects that are familiar, than of those that are 
not; our conceptions of visible objects are com-
monly the most lively, when other circumstances 
are equal. Hence, poets not only delight in the 
description of visible objects, but find means by 
metaphor, analogy, and allusion, to clothe every 
object they describe with visible qualities. The 
lively conception of these makes the object to 
appear, as it were, before our eyes. Lord Kames, 
in his Elements of Criticism, has shown of what 
importance it is in works of taste, to give to 
objects described, what he calls ideal presence. 
To produce this in the mind, is indeed the capital 
aim of poetical and rhetorical description. It 
carries the man, as it were, out of himself, and 
makes him a spectator of the scene described. 
This ideal presence seems to me to be nothing 
else but a lively conception of the appearance 
which the object would make if really present to 
the eye. 
ENARGEIA IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY 
Having discussed what might be called the rhetorical 
and aesthetic aspects of the doctrine of enargeia, I would now 
like to consider what might be called the epistemological 
dimension of this term and its synonyms. I have already 
mentioned that, even among ancient rhetoricians, vivid de-
scription was considered one device to convince the audience 
of the reality and truth of the orator's statements and to 
persuade an audience by getting them to "see before their 
eyes" what the speaker wants them to believe. 
Although Descartes is often considered the father of 
modem philosophy, some recent writers have considered his 
system as an attempt to overthrow the doubts of the Scep-
tics. Descartes proceeded with his method of doubt to look 
for an indubitable truth, which he found in his famous Cogito, 
ergo sum. By inspecting this one truth, Descartes finds the 
criterion of truth. He comes to the conclusion that there is 
nothing in the proposition "I think, therefore I am" which 
assures him of the truth except that he sees very clearly and 
distinctly what is affirmed. Descartes (1965 :29) wrote: 
"Certainly in this first knowledge there is nothing that assures 
me of its truth, excepting the clear and distinct perception of 
that which I state .... And accordingly it seems to me that 
already I can establish as a general rule that all things which 
I perceive very clearly and very distinctly are true." The 
cogito strikes us so strongly with its clarity and distinctness 
that we cannot doubt it-it carries its own evidence with it 
or is self~vident. (It is interesting to note that Cicero used the 
Latin word evidentia for the Greek enargeia.) 
Descartes' opponents, of course, often attacked his 
system on the matter of clear and distinct truths. "A central 
theme of these criticisms [of Gassendi and Mersenne] is to 
question whether the fact that Descartes claimed to be cer-
tain, to perceive clearly and distinctly that the propositions 
he advanced were true, sufficed to make them true. Perhaps, 
they suggested, in spite of how Descartes felt about these 
propositions, it might still be the case that they were false" 
(popkin, 1964:204). In a note to the article on ''Pyrrho'' 
in Bayle's Dictionary, Popkin (1965 :199) remarks: "In seven-
teenth-century discussions, l'evidence is the mark of truth, 
which, when present, makes it impossible to doubt a proposi-
tion. In Fureti~re's Dictionnaire universel (1727 ed.) the 
following entries are ,offered to explain the meaning of I'evi-
dence: 'Manifest certainty, the quality of things that makes 
them clearly visible and knowable, as much to the body's 
eyes as to its mind. The consent which arises from I'evidence 
of a thing is more unshakeable than that which faith exacts 
(Huet). One has to accept l'evidence, which cannot be re-
sisted as soon as it makes itself felt in us (Le Clerc) .... '" 
In these passages it is clear that l'evidence is a synonym 
for enargeia, derived, of course, from Cicero's rendering of 
that Greek term with the Latin evidentia. L 'evidence is short-
hand for the clear and distinct ideas of reason which are 
incon trovertibly true. 
Following Descartes, Leibniz, and Wolff, the Continental 
rationalists (and many English writers, too) continually pro-
pounded the notion of clear and distinct ideas. Sometimes, 
as in Descartes, the "clear and distinct" ideas of reason were 
separated from the "obscure and confused" ideas of sense. 
Most of the popular logics of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries included long discussions of the nature of clear, 
distinct, and vivid ideas. 
In Germany, Leibniz and Wolff constructed a whole 
chart of ideas. "Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear 
ideas again are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are 
either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect 
knowledge, fmally, is that which is both adequate and intui-
tive" (Leibniz, in Wiener, 1951 :283). According to these 
philosophers, if we follow the proper procedure, we progress 
from obscure and confused ideas to clear and distinct ideas. 
This progress from "dunckeler Begrif" to "klarer Begrif" 
prOvided the often overlooked technical meaning for the origin 
of the term "Enlightenment." As we move from "dark" to 
"clear" concepts, we use the light of reason to enlighten our 
knowledge. 
A quotation from a popular French book on logic, that 
was also translated into English, will reveal all of the common 
synonyms for enargeia used in a brief passage. Jean Pierre de 
Crousaz (1724, 2 :3) wrote: 
The Distinction of Ideas into clear and obscure, 
distinct and confused, offers itself first. And in-
deed it is one of the most usual and important 
Distinctions. . . . Every Idea is an Act, which 
perceives itself; and therefore it has essentially 
some Life and some Activity; it affects us with 
some Force. Since it is known and perceived, it 
has some Clearness, some Evidence .... I grant 
that all our Ideas do not discover to us their 
Objects with the same Clearness and the same 
Exactness .... Wherefore every.. Idea has essen-
tially some Clearness and some Distinctness; but 
the most lively, that is, those which are best per-
ceived, are the clearest, and for that reason the 
most distinct. We distinguish more easily what 
makes a more lively Impression upon us, because 
it raises a greater Attention. Thus Clearness and 
Distinctness are two different Characters; but one 
of them is always a Consequence of the other. 
In this passage, clearness, distinctness, vividness, and 
evidence are all variations on our old rhetorical term, enargeia. 
Force and liveliness are two terms that were often used as 
substitutes for vividness. 
If we tum to the British philosophers of the eighteenth 
century, we will find that they, too, used the Cartesian cri-
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terion in a modified fonn, but applied it to sense impressions 
rather than intellectual concepts. Hume (1888:1) was very 
concerned with trying to differentiate between impressions 
and ideas. The very first paragraph of his Treatise begins: 
All the perceptions of the hurnan mind resolve 
themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall 
call Impressions and Ideas. The difference betwixt 
these consists in the degrees of force and 
with which they strike upon the mind and make 
their way into our thought or consciousness. 
In Hurne's analysis there are three kinds of perceptions; 
they are differentiated by their force, vivacity, or liveliness. 
Sensations are the most vivid; ideas of memory have less 
vivacity; and ideas of the imagination are the least vivid. "And 
as an idea of memory, by losing its force and vivacity, may 
degenerate to such a degree as to be taken for an idea of the 
imagination; so on the other hand an idea of the imagination 
may acquire such a force and vivacity as to pass for an idea 
of the memory .... " (Hurne, 1888 :86). 
Iri discussing the different force of ideas, Hume also 
reverts to the tenn "distinct" and the imagery of color so 
familiar to us. "'Tis evident at first sight, that the ideas of the 
memory are much more lively and strong than those of the 
imagination, and that the fonner facwty paints its object in 
more distinct colours, than any which are employ'd by the 
latter" (Hume, 18889). 
Hume's definition of belief or assent is dependent on 
his adaptation of the Cartesian criterion of truth. "Thus it 
appears, that the belief or assent, which always attends the 
memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those per-
ceptions they present; and that this alone distinguishes them 
from the imagination" (Hume, 1888:86). Hume states his 
definition of belief as follows: 
When you wou'd any way vary the idea of a par-
ticular object, you can only increase or diminish 
its force and vivacity .... An opinion, therefore, 
or belief may be most accurately defin'd, A LNE-
LY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED 
WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION (Hume, 1886: 
96). 
Hume, obviously, felt some discomfort with his defini-
tion of belief as consisting in the vivacity of ideas. In an appen-
dix to the Treatise, Hume (1888:628) adds the following 
corrective passage: 
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This operation of the mind, which fonns the belief 
in any matter of fact, seems hitherto to have been 
one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy .... 
For my part I must own, that I find a considerable 
difficwty in the case .... I am at a loss to express 
my meaning. . .. An opinion or belief is nothing 
but an idea, that is different from a fiction, not 
in the nature, or the order of its parts, but in the 
manner of its being conceiv'd. But when I wou'd 
explain this manner, I scarce fmd any word that 
fully answers the case .... An idea assented to 
feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy 
alone presents to us. And this different feeling I 
endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, 
or vivacity, or solidity, or finnness or steady-
ness .... And in philosophy we can go no farther, 
than assert, that it is something felt by the mind, 
which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment 
from the fictions of the imagination. 
It seems that the young Scotsman was unaware that his 
solution to "one of the -greatest mysteries of philosophy" was 
a very old one indeed. Both the Stoic and Epicurean philo-
sophers had assumed that all knowledge came from sense 
perceptions. Epicurus ''has aisthesis serve as the guarantor 
of its own validity, and this by reason of its clear and self-
evident nature,(enargeia ..• )" (peters, 1967:52). When Hume 
compares the greater vividness of ideas assented to with the 
less vivid fictions of the imagination, he has returned to the 
old criterion of enargeia. 
Hume's opponent, Reid (1969:618) cowd not agree 
with Hume that ''to believe in the existence of anything, is 
nothing else than to have a strong and lively conception of 
it." But in his attempt to combat Hurne's scepticism, Reid 
argued for a large class of intuitive judgments or propositions 
that need no argument to support them. These intuitive judg-
ments or self.evident principles, he often refers to as the prin-
ciples of Common Sense. Reid admits that since the time of 
Descartes, philosophers have tried to get along with as few 
self.evident judgments as possible. He was convinced, however, 
that the classes of intuitive judgments had to be widened in 
order to combat Hume's scepticism. In describing some of 
the principles of common sense, Reid (1969:559) claims that 
they have l'evidence and therefore do not need to be proven: 
"All knowledge, and all science, must be built upon principles 
that are self-evident; and of such principles, every man who 
has common sense is a competent judge when he conceives 
them distinctly." In discussing some of the first principles 
that he introduces directly to combat his interpretation of 
Hurne's scepticism, Reid uses variation of distinctness as a 
criterion of truth. To guarantee the testimony of memory, 
Reid (1969 :622) relies on the first principle, ''that those 
things did really happen which I distinctly remember." The 
existence of objects in the world and veridical perception is 
assured by the first principle that ''those things do really .. 
exist which we distinctly perceive by our sense, and are what 
we perceive them to be" (Reid, 1969:625). 
It is rather ironic that philosophers of such differing 
outlooks and with such different philosophies as Descartes; 
Hume, and Reid all used concepts derived from the old rhe) 
torical and philosophical tenn enargeia. No doubt, one cow'" 
write a long history of this idea as Lovejoy did on the Great 
Chain of Being, or Monk did on The Sublime. Suffice it to 
say that enargeia played a significant role in rhetoric, poetry, 
and philosophy. In poetic theory, vivid descriptions were 
advocated by literary theorists because they provided aesthetic 
pleasure, commanded attention, operated on the emotions, 
and were longer remembered. In rhetorical theory, orators 
were enjoined to set things before the audience's eyes, to paint 
in living colors, to describe vividly, and to give an ocular 
demonstration of the facts. The goal, of course, was not only 
to hold the hearer's attention and interest or to arouse the 
emotions, but also to get the audience to see and believe the 
speaker's proposition. Among philosophers, the various 
synonyms and derivatives of enargeia were often used as 
criteria for truth or belief. 
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